The article discusses the significance of symbols within constitutional law by analyzing the role of laws introducing traditional national symbols into two legal systems characterized by a mixture of secular and traditional traits-India and Israel. Specifically, it focuses on the legal prohibitions on cattle slaughter in India and on pig growing and pork trading in Israel, animals considered "key symbols" in their respective cultures. Changes in the social and political context emerged as crucial for the legal regulation of these symbols as well as for its durability. Despite the similarities in their starting points, the Indian and the Israeli systems have ultimately taken divergent courses, reflecting differences in their respective contexts and underlying tensions. Whereas Indian cattle slaughter prohibitions are expanding with the constitutional backing of the Indian Supreme Court, pig-related prohibitions in Israel are declining, again with the constitutional backing of the Israeli Supreme Court. The article explains this difference by placing these symbols in a wider social context. Cattle slaughter in India has long been a consistent source of tension with the Muslim community. The basic strain that led to the original legislation, then, remains just as powerful, encouraging the preservation and expansion of laws forbidding cattle slaughter. By contrast, pig prohibitions in Jewish culture developed in the context of persecutions by Greco-Roman rulers and later on in Christian Europe. The "other" against whom this prohibition developed, however, is no longer part of public life in Israel. In addition, the Muslim community in Israel is equally averse to pigs. As time passed, then, the importance of pig prohibitions for Israeli secular Jews within the context of their national identity has declined, and they are currently perceived as a source of tension between secular and religious Jews. Many secular Israelis indeed view the pressure for pig-related legal prohibitions more as a symbol of religious coercion than as a national symbol of identification.
I. Symbols and Constitutional Law
Legal norms at times reflect symbols. Legislation protecting national flags is an obvious example.
1 This article discusses the significance of symbols within the context of constitutional law by analyzing the role of laws introducing traditional national symbols into two legal systems characterized by a mixture of secular and traditional traits-India and Israel.
2 Specifically, it focuses on the legal prohibition on cattle slaughter in India and on pig growing and pork trading in Israel, animals considered "key symbols" in their respective cultures. 3 My starting assumption in this discussion is that symbols are significant, in the sense developed by Clifford Geertz: 4 But meanings can only be "stored" in symbols: a cross, a crescent, or a feathered serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatized in rituals or related in myths, are felt somehow to sum up, for those for whom they are resonant, what is known about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it. Sacred symbols thus relate an ontology and cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality: Their peculiar power comes from their presumed ability to identify fact with value at the most fundamental level, to give to what is otherwise merely actual, a comprehensive normative import. The number of such synthesizing symbols is limited in any culture, and though we might think that a people could construct a wholly autonomous value system independent of any metaphysical referent, an ethics without ontology, we do not in fact seem to have found such a people. 5 The analysis is inspired by the growing interest in the relationship between law and culture. The cultural study of law shows that legal controversies and legal reasoning often reflect underlying cultural perceptions. 6 The cultural study of law is of particular interest in this context because it focuses on communities, 7 and the symbols to be Rev. 231 (1996) . 7. Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law (1999), p. 112: "the object of cultural study is the community in its appearance as single, historical subject."
addressed are symbols of cultural communities. This article takes into consideration the symbolic function of legal norms and looks into the implications of affirming symbols through law. 8 As Joseph Gusfield notes, "The fact of affirmation through acts of law and government expresses the public worth of one set of norms, of one sub-culture vis-à-vis those of others. It demonstrates which cultures have legitimacy and public domination, and which do not." 9 The two case studies chosen for analysis show close resemblances: both rest on symbols fundamental to their respective domestic cultures-symbols which have religious roots but are also significant within the wider context of the national culture. In both cases the symbols discussed are traditional, and at the same time reflect also the phenomenon of ''invented tradition,'' in the sense this term has been used by Hobsbawm-as they were subject to changing meanings and uses over time, also in the context of nation-building. 10 In addition, both have implications for individual liberties. Accordingly, the introduction of these symbols into law was part of the constitutional debate in India as well as in Israel. The article traces the course of these symbolic norms in both countries since their independence and until today, highlighting similarities and differences. The analysis 8 . Another example that may merit similar discussion is the placing of crosses in public places.
On reveals that changes in the underlying social and political context are crucial to the legal regulation of symbols in general and to their durability in particular.
II. Sacred Cows and Abominable Pigs: The Cultural Background

Cows in Hindu Culture
The sacredness of the cow in India dates back thousands of years. It is expressed in Hindu mythology and significantly related to the worship of Krishna. The cow is often referred to as "mother" and as the source of life. 11 Over the years, cows have also acquired national significance. The slaughter of cattle is engraved in Indian national memory as associated with national oppression, at first by Muslim conquerors and later by the British. 12 Cattle slaughter served as a constant source of unrest in colonial India and, as Indian nationalism gained increasing power, initiatives aimed at the protection of cattle gradually accumulated support. 13 These initiatives were often mixed with anti-Muslim sentiments: the insistence of Muslims on beef-eating was perceived as a deliberate affront.
14 Mahatma Gandhi, who led the Indian national movement, was strongly identified with the protests against cow-killing. 15 
Pigs in Jewish Culture
The abomination of pigs in Jewish culture is also an ancient and deeply entrenched tradition. The prohibition on pigs originates in the Bible 16 but gained significance later on, when it was used as a tool for persecuting Jews in the Greco-Roman world as well as in Christian Europe. For centuries, stories about the self-sacrifice and devotion of Jews who refused to abide orders to eat pork have served as educational examples. The leading legend is that of Hannah and her seven sons, who were martyred for their refusal to eat pork. 17 The anthropologist Mary Douglas considered these persecutions during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, the Hellenistic king, a turning point that bestowed upon the pig its special symbolic status in Jewish culture. Referring to these persecutions, she states: "So it was he, by his action, who forced into prominence the rule concerning pork as the critical symbol of group allegiance." 18 The significance of the Jews' revulsion from pigs persisted in Christian Europe, where it gained a special status in anti-Semitic tradition.
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When Jews began to establish a political community in Israel, initiatives were promoted to ensure the presence of traditional Jewish symbols. The historical revulsion at pigs was certainly considered in this respect, but as long as Palestine was under British rule (as was India), the scope for such national sentiments was limited and channeled mainly into local initiatives to appeal to the British authorities.
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III. Laying the Foundations: From Tradition to Legislation and Constitution-Making
Despite the obvious differences between them, the similarities between India and Israel justify a comparative analysis. Both countries proclaimed their independence during the same period, India in 1947 and Israel in 1948, at the end of British colonialism. Both shared an aspiration to establish modern democracies, both sought to preserve their ties with their respective ancestral cultures, and both were home to multicultural populations, and had to face religious and ethnic tensions. In both countries, these tensions have led to legal controversies decided by the courts. More generally, both India and Israel face a similar problem: to what extent would their respective legal systems adhere to tradition as part of the project of nation-building. In the context of the specific prohibitions discussed in this article, both countries have opted for a solution that tried to deal with the tensions around the legislation on the traditional prohibitions by allocating the power to decide on solutions to the local level, not necessarily in a successful manner. they are unclean to you" (Leviticus 11:7-8); "And the swine, because it divides the hoof, yet chews not the cud, is unclean unto you: you shall not eat of their meat, nor touch their carcasses" (Deuteronomy 14:8 The challenges of balancing between secularism and tradition obviously did not focus only, or even mainly, on the issue of cows in India and pigs in Israel. 21 They had inspired controversies in other areas regulated by law, as well as the drafting of constitutional documents. 22 Accordingly, the following discussion addresses the case study of cattle slaughter prohibitions and pig-related prohibitions as a microcosm reflecting broader tensions.
The Compromise in the Indian Constitution
India introduced a norm affirming the cultural prohibition on cattle slaughter from the outset by integrating it into its constitution. Article 48 of the Indian Constitution, considered one of the Constitution's Directive Principles of State Policy, requires the adoption of measures prohibiting the slaughter of cattle: "The State shall endeavor to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milk and draught cattle." This provision, inspired by the Hindu tradition that views cows as holy, was based on strong popular sentiment. The need to ban cow slaughter was debated in the Indian Constituent Assembly and explained by its supporters as not only a religious matter but as a cultural and economic interest as well.
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Although the Indian Constitution affirmed the cultural prohibition, this affirmation entailed a compromise: the prohibition on cattle slaughter is considered only a directive principle. Accordingly, it only encourages states to enact laws on this matter. The 21. An important example worth noting is that of family law. Both India and Israel opened the door to the application of their various communities' religious laws in the area of family law by applying to each individual the law of his or her religious group. The details of this basic choice, however, are different in the two countries. In Israel, the application of religious law is focused mainly on marriage and divorce. Formally, there is no right of exit from this regulation of marriage and divorce but, in practice, several mechanisms limit the consequences of the basic principle (such as affording full social and economic rights and privileges to cohabitants and registering civil marriages that took place in other countries, including so-called Cyprus marriages conducted in the neighboring island of Cyprus). In India, the application of family law is also significant in other contexts of family law. Formally, it is possible to opt for a civil marriage but, in practice, the vast majority of the population does not resort to this option. constitution, then, gave significant backing to the possibility of legislation in this area but decided to allocate the matter to the states, leaving open the option of non-legislation, for instance, in Muslim-dominated areas. 24 In practice, various states do have legislation banning the slaughter of cattle, with certain nuances discussed below. At the same time, an initiative to legislate a general cattle preservation law for the whole country, brought to the Indian parliament in the mid-1950s, was rejected, after a heated debate. 25 
The Compromise in Israeli Legislation
Contrary to India, the introduction of pig prohibitions into Israeli law was not part of a constitution-writing project, if only because Israel did not adopt a constitution after its establishment, due to unresolved tensions and controversies around the constitutional project.
26 Accordingly, initiatives to introduce into Israeli law traditional Jewish prohibitions on pig growing and pork trading were confined to the legislative and administrative spheres. Hence, when Israeli courts are asked to review these initiatives, they lack a specific constitutional norm to guide them on this matter.
Nevertheless, after Israel was established, calls appeared in the public and political spheres for legislation that would introduce pig-related prohibitions into Israeli law. After the Supreme Court invalidated the use of existing administrative powers to promote this ideological cause without express authorization (for instance, by refusing to grant business licenses), 27 legislation became necessary (from the perspective of the supporters of the prohibitions). The calls to legislate in this area fitted the general tendency to engage in a project of nation-building during Israel's formative years. 28 In 1957, the Israeli Knesset enacted its first pig-related law by authorizing local municipalities to prohibit trade in pork within their limits. 30 This form of legislation calls to mind the Indian approach of a geographically based regulation. In 1962, however, public sentiment on this matter combined with political pressure to enact another law that prohibited pig growing in the whole of Israel, with narrow exceptions for an area populated mainly by Christians and for research purposes and zoos.
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IV. Formative Litigation
Constitutional Review and Limitations on the Prohibition in India
Bans on cattle slaughter have gradually been introduced in various states in India, and have raised questions since the very beginning. Given the protection of fundamental freedoms ensured by the Indian constitution, these laws have been attacked in the courts.
The basic precedent of the Indian Supreme Court in this matter was laid down in the late 1950s in the petition of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. Bihar, 32 filed by Muslim butchers. The petitioners argued that the prohibition on slaughtering cattle infringed their freedom of occupation as well as their religious customs. The court held that the state is allowed to restrict fundamental freedoms in order to uphold the Directive Principles of State Policy. A restriction, however, must be reasonable. Insofar as this petition was based on the right to freedom of religion, however, it was rejected outright due to the lack of any evidence that cattle slaughtering was a religious duty in Islam. As for the infringement of freedom of occupation, the Court found that the legislation could be considered reasonable if it addressed cattle yielding milk or used for breeding or work. Yet, and as an exception to this limitation, the Court did uphold the total prohibition on the slaughter of cows but not on other cattle. Judicial review, then, introduced a limited change in the scope of the prohibition, but did clarify that the prohibitions must meet a test of reasonableness.
Other judicial decisions issued during this period followed this initial precedent and approved the same principles with regard to legislative amendments that had tried to circumvent the limited scope of legal cattle slaughter recognized by the Court. In these cases as well, the Court upheld its main rulings on the constitutionality of legislation aimed to place significant restrictions on the slaughter of cattle, and the need to impose age limitations on the total prohibition to exclude cattle that cannot be used for agriculture. 33 
Judicial Decision-Making in the Shadow of Legislative Sovereignty in Israel
After the Israeli Knesset passed laws on pig growing and pork trading, prospects for petitions in this matter were limited for the noted reason-Israel did not have a constitution and followed the tradition of legislative sovereignty.
34 Therefore, although the Israeli Supreme Court had intervened in administrative decisions aimed at limiting pig-related activities when they were not backed by legislation, no room was left for any significant decision-making in this area, besides the interpretation of the relevant legislation. 
V. New Challenges to Old Norms
The following analysis will focus on developments pertaining to the application of the two legal regimes described so far-the prohibition on cattle slaughter in India and pigrelated prohibitions in Israel. Despite the similarities in their original structure, resting on a compromise, they have ultimately followed different courses, reflecting the differences in context and in the underlying tensions.
The Re-Emergence of the Prohibition on Cattle Slaughter in India
Years after Indian constitutional law had appeared to have reached a balance regarding the scope of the cattle slaughter legislation, the issue re-emerged when attempts were made to broaden it. Tensions centered on the scope of the prohibitions related to other cattle, besides cows (which are covered by an absolute ban that was regarded as constitutional even in the fundamental Quareshi precedent).
The forces of change have been the growing Hindu pressure to broaden the scope of the prohibiting legislation, and the steady Muslim resistance manifest in challenges submitted to the courts on this matter. These developments coincided with growing tensions between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority in India, manifested also in events of communal violence. The processes that culminated in the Indian state of Gujarat, where the Hindu Nationalist Party (BJP) has been very powerful, can serve as a telling example. Gujarat's first law on the matter, dating back to the 1950s, had prohibited the slaughter of cows. In 1979, the law was amended to include prohibitions on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks under the age of fifteen. This amendment was recognized as constitutional by the Supreme Court of India. 37 In 1994, the law was amended yet again to broaden the prohibition even further and include all cattle indiscriminately, irrespective of age. This amendment seemed to contradict the old case law holding that the prohibition should be reasonable and consider potential agricultural uses of the cattle, which is irrelevant regarding very old animals. Accordingly, the amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court of Gujarat, but the state appealed this decision. This matter then became the subject of a new precedent of the Indian Supreme Court on this question, discussed below.
In a similar manner, Muslims in India have never accepted the status quo concerning the application of slaughter prohibitions to their religious practices. The demand to allow the use of cows in religious ceremonies remained in place and the annual celebrations of Bakri-Id proved to be a constant source of unrest, although Muslims elsewhere also use other animals as well, such as sheep, for this purpose. In the mid-1990s, this practice became the subject of litigation when Hindu citizens in West Bengal submitted petitions against the policy of giving Muslims exemptions from the prohibition on cow slaughter on the occasion of Bakri-Id. The petitions were accepted by the Calcutta High Court and its judgment was later affirmed by the Indian Supreme Court when it held that, according to the applicable law, the government was not authorized to give such exemptions because Muslims are not under a religious duty to bring cow sacrifices.
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At about this time, cattle slaughter in India was the subject of an influential report submitted by the National Committee on Cattle. This report conveys a commitment to broaden and enforce legislation banning cattle slaughtering-based on national and agricultural grounds. In its conclusions, the report recommends an absolute prohibition on the slaughter of cattle, and even an amendment to the constitution so as to empower parliament to enact a countrywide law on the matter. 39 In 2004, the lower house of the Indian legislature led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, adopted a nonbinding resolution seeking a national ban on cow slaughter. 40 The most recent amendment of the Gujarat law was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court of India in 2005. 41 The Court decided this sensitive case by a majority ruling that accepted the appeal of the State of Gujarat and held that even the sweeping prohibition that extends to all cattle, irrespective of age and kind, can be considered constitutional. In this decision, the majority justices showed their willingness to depart from the fundamental precedent in this area issued in the 1950s. Although this decision certainly reflects the growing Hindu nationalist tensions around the prohibition norm, its rationale did not adduce cultural and national explanations and argued instead that the Court found that the arguments on the importance of cattle for various uses, even when old, were convincing. In the Court's view, the justification for abandoning the precedent was that developments in science and agronomy have changed the factual basis which justified the Quareshi decision set down almost fifty years ago. The majority judgment cites in detail the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat by experts of agriculture and animal husbandry, as well as the findings and conclusions of the report of the National Committee on Cattle. According to this judgment, the old precedent was based on ''a mixed finding of fact and law,'' and therefore, ''once the strength of the factual component is shaken, the legal component … loses much of its significance.'' 42 With view of the scientific evidence before the Court, the majority Justices concluded that ''in the case before us, we have material in abundance justifying the need to alter the follow of judicial opinion.'' 43
The Decline of Pig Prohibitions in Israel
By contrast, the 1990s marked the beginning of a relative decline in pig-related legal prohibitions in Israel. The resurgence of the pig crisis in Israeli law during the 1990s can be attributed to developments in three main areas: legal, social, and political.
The chief development in the legal area, described as a "constitutional revolution," Laws on human rights rather than on structural aspects of the regime. Soon after, the new Basic Laws were interpreted as empowering the judiciary to overrule legislation that restricts the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Laws. 45 Prohibiting pork sales or pig growing could easily be viewed as an instance of such a restriction, curtailing several freedoms. Pig prohibitions, therefore, were potential targets of petitions based on the new Basic Laws. True, the two Basic Laws did not expressly protect freedom of religion. Attempts to ensure this freedom through a Basic Law could not have mobilized sufficient political support due to the religious parties' political power. These parties understood that full recognition of this liberty could threaten the validity of religiously inspired extant legislation, including the implementation of religious law on matters of marriage and divorce. The new Basic Laws included, however, other relevant provisions that potentially threatened the future of pig prohibitions in Israeli law, such 42 . More specifically, the judgment indicated several changes, such as the lack of food shortage in India at present (whereas in the past the slaughter of cattle was important as a source of protein for some social groups), and the possibility to provide for enough food even for old cattle (in contrast to the past). as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of occupation. Indeed, the new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which had seemed politically harmless when originally enacted, was soon revealed as directly relevant to the restrictions on pork trading and hence controversial. As shown below, pig prohibitions have since been challenged largely on grounds of freedom of occupation rather than by recourse to arguments concerning freedom of religion and opposition to religious coercion, which had characterized the 1950s debates. 46 The challenge that the new Basic Laws posed to these prohibitions is especially complicated, since their declared purpose is to "establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." 47 In this context, as in others, this constitutional formulation leads to questions and tensions: how should "Jewish" and "democratic" be reconciled? Pig prohibitions could be expected in a Jewish state, but is this also the case when democratic values are considered?
In the social realm, the 1990s were the time of a large wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. About a million people arrived in Israel during this decade, a figure amounting to approximately one sixth of the country's population. The new immigrants came to Israel as Jews or as descendants of Jews, taking advantage of the Law of Return, 1951. Culturally and religiously, however, and after more than seventy years of a Communist regime wary of religion and nationalism in general and of their Jewish manifestations in particular, these immigrants were detached from Jewish traditions. To the new immigrants, some of whom are not even Jews according to Halakhic criteria, 48 the usual revulsion evoked by pigs meant almost nothing. Pork was part of their fare, and their demand for it gave new momentum to the pork trade. Accordingly, new businesses offered pork products and these changes led to renewed efforts to enforce by-laws on pork trade that were hardly in use for years. In the political sphere and due to a change in the electoral system, the 1990s were marked by flourishing sectarianism. The change was introduced in a new version of the Basic Law: The Government which was also enacted in 1992. According to this Basic Law, in addition to voting for a party represented in the Knesset, voters elected the prime minister in separate and direct elections, unlike the traditional system of parliamentary elections that grants the office to the leader of the party supported by a parliamentary majority. Although the split vote system was intended to take effect only in the elections that would follow four years later, its repercussions were already felt in the 1992 elections. Voters increasingly used the split vote system to support small parties representing their group interests. 49 Controversies regarding pork-trading prohibitions in the municipal arena eventually reached the Israeli Supreme Court when several municipalities, usually after enacting new by-laws on this matter, began to invest further resources in enforcement. This tendency characterized cities and towns with a relatively large population of immigrants from the former USSR, which influenced the local trade in pork.
The decision on these petitions, known as the Solodkin case, marks the relative decline in the motivation to enforce the historic pig laws. 50 The decision, written by Chief Justice Barak, begins by outlining the purpose of the Special Enablement Law as understood by the Court: to protect the feelings of Jews who perceive the pig as a symbol of ritual impurity and of the persecutions suffered by the Jewish people, to protect individual liberties by setting limitations on the administrative power to regulate pork trade, and to enable a nuanced regulation of this matter according to the local characteristics of each community. Resting on this theoretical framework, the decision illustrates its application to a hypothetical municipality that includes three neighborhoods: one in which most residents would be offended by the sale of pork, one in which most residents are interested in purchasing pork, and one with a heterogeneous population divided on this issue. The decision emphasizes that the Special Enablement Law does not mandate one rule for the municipality's entire area and includes the option of limiting the by-law's scope to specific sections within its area of jurisdiction.
The ruling then proceeds to outline a model analysis for each of these hypothetical neighborhoods. In the first neighborhood, populated by a vast majority opposing the idea of pork sales, a ban on pork trading would be considered proportionate and therefore legal. The decision assumes that the prohibition would infringe the liberties of minority residents interested in purchasing pork in this neighborhood as well as those of butchers interested in selling it. It adds that this infringement would be justified, however, considering the 49. This electoral system proved just as problematic as the one it had meant to improve, and was once again changed in 2001, when a new-old version of Basic Law: the Government was enacted, abolishing direct elections for the prime minister and reverting to the conventional parliamentary system. While in force, the split system led to voting patterns that increased competition between the religious parties, including on symbolic issues such as pig-related prohibitions. They also intensified opposition to these attempts in such parties as Israel beAliyah, which drew its constituents mainly from former USSR immigrants, and Shinui, an ultra-secularist party that made the struggle against religious coercion its motto. weight that should be given to the feelings of the majority, and assuming that pork could indeed be purchased nearby. By contrast, in the second hypothetical neighborhood, where a significant majority opposes limitations on the sale of pork, applying a by-law prohibiting the sale of pork would be disproportionate and therefore illegal. On this basis, the decision then proceeds to evaluate the third hypothetical neighborhood, where a mixed population lives in an area that cannot be divided into smaller and relatively homogenous sections. According to the Court, decisions on this count may vary. The decision does recognize the possibility that applying a municipal by-law prohibiting pork sale might be legal in such neighborhoods but only on condition that pork is made reasonably accessible, be it at the outskirts of the neighborhood or in a nearby one. In sum, the new approach of the Israeli Supreme Court applied reasonableness criteria to the application of the prohibitions, just as the Indian Supreme Court abandoned this approach with regard to cattle slaughter.
VI. Considering the Differences: Majority-Minority Tensions vis-à-vis Tensions within the Majority
The two constitutional stories that developed around symbolic cultural norms in India and in Israel reveal significant similarities in the ways these two systems translated their tradition into legal regulation. The resemblances between them, however, have recently lessened: whereas cattle slaughter prohibitions in India are growing with the constitutional backing of the Indian Supreme Court, pig-related prohibitions in Israel are declining, 51 also with the constitutional backing of the Israeli Supreme Court. What is the reason for these opposite developments?
Both stories are rich and have been affected by many elements, which are beyond the scope of this article. One factor, however, must be considered, as a major element with significant-and variant-impact. Cattle slaughter in India has been a persistent and ongoing source of tension with the Muslim community. The basic tension that led to the legislation remains just as powerful today, encouraging the preservation and expansion of laws forbidding cattle slaughter. 52 By contrast, pig prohibitions in Jewish culture developed in the context of persecutions instigated by Greco-Roman rulers and later by Christian ones in Europe. The "other" against whom this prohibition developed is no longer part of public life in Israel. In addition, the Muslim community in Israel is equally averse to pigs. As time passed, then, the importance of pig prohibitions for secular Israeli Jews within the context of their national identity has declined, shifting to the level of an internal strain between secular and religious Jews. 53 The ban on pigs had acquired its symbolic meaning 51. There is an obvious decline in the intensity of the controversies around the legal regulation on pork trade and pig growing, as they are reflected in the press and the political arena, with some exceptions, such as the controversial initiative to enact a new by-law on pork-trade in the municipality of Netanaya in 2007. 52. For the significance of current Hindu nationalism in the context of the sacred cow debate in India, see: Lodrick, ''Symbol and Sustenance,'' pp. 78-9. 53. The opposition of Christians in Israel to the prohibition on pigs and pork were relatively marginal, due to the fact that Israel's Christian population is small. In addition, Israel had mainly in the Diaspora, or at least in contexts of national humiliation and subjugation. In the early years of the state, most of Israel's public leaders were not native-born and still carried memories (and possibly scars) of life in the Diaspora, and perhaps of affronts associated with pigs. 54 As time goes by, this association is fading and resistance against pig prohibitions grows. Pressures to endorse pig-related legal prohibitions are perceived by many secular Israelis more as a symbol of religious coercion than as a national symbol of identification. 55 In other words, the different social and political contexts against which the two sets of prohibitions were implemented had significant consequences. In India, prohibitions on cattle slaughter have been understood and applied in the context of the majority-minority tension between the Hindus and the Muslims and were accordingly broadened by a Supreme Court which identifies itself with Hindu culture. The tendency of the Indian Supreme Court to side (at least partially) with Hindu perceptions of nationalism has been indicated in other contexts as well. 56 In Israel, pig-related prohibitions have been mainly an issue for controversy within the majority Jewish community, and were therefore loosened by a Supreme Court which identifies itself with the secular and liberal parts of the Jewish society in Israel. 57 This observation does not imply that the Israeli Supreme Court is more liberal than its Indian counterpart. It only means that the manner in which the Israeli Supreme Court was situated vis-à-vis the pork prohibitions controversy, understood as an inner-Jewish debate, made it easier for this court to express its liberal tendencies; whereas the Indian Supreme Court had to confront the re-emerging cattleslaughter controversy against a completely different background of heated HinduMuslim tension, which had probably left its hidden mark on its decision-making in this context. Yet, from another perspective, it is possible to argue that the two courts have chosen a similar route in the sense that they both sided with the majority-the Hindu majority, in the Indian context, and the secular majority within the Jewish group, in the Israeli context.
At any rate, as far as the two case-studies are analyzed as examples for the aspiration to integrate symbols into the law, they show how symbols do not only shape the law, but are also subject to the transformation of their meanings when debated in the legal arena.
